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Abstract
Recent advances in artificial intelligence make it progres-
sively hard to distinguish between genuine and counterfeit me-
dia, especially images and videos. One recent development is the
rise of deepfake videos, based on manipulating videos using ad-
vanced machine learning techniques. This involves replacing the
face of an individual from a source video with the face of a second
person, in the destination video. This idea is becoming progres-
sively refined as deepfakes are getting progressively seamless and
simpler to compute. Combined with the outreach and speed of so-
cial media, deepfakes could easily fool individuals when depicting
someone saying things that never happened and thus could per-
suade people in believing fictional scenarios, creating distress,
and spreading fake news. In this paper, we examine a technique
for possible identification of deepfake videos. We use Euler video
magnification which applies spatial decomposition and temporal
filtering on video data to highlight and magnify hidden features
like skin pulsation and subtle motions. Our approach uses fea-
tures extracted from the Euler technique to train three models to
classify counterfeit and unaltered videos and compare the results
with existing techniques.
Introduction
Deepfakes describes a technique for artificially manipulat-
ing video, initially applied to swap celebrities faces into video
recordings which were shared on sites like Reddit [13]. They op-
erate by replacing the face of one person in an original video, with
a second person, inserted so that head movement, facial expres-
sions, lighting and lip syncing when talking, are all exactly as in
the original video. While many thousands of images of the second
person to be superimposed into the deepfake, are usually required,
recent work has shown that good deepfakes can be generated with
a reduced number [21]. This means fake videos can be realistic
and can be generated with small amounts of training data.
Deepfakes can be recognised as both an opportunity and a
threat because they permit users with relatively little computing
experience in machine learning or computer programming to gen-
erate almost seamless fake videos. The availability of state of the
art deep learning libraries such as TensorFlow [1] and Keras [7],
with enough accessible training data of facial images, allows gen-
eration of fake video recordings whose quality is so good they can
be very persuading [11].
The initial implementations of deepfakes relied on convolu-
tional autoencoders [22]. Images of both subjects are reduced to
lower dimensions using an encoder and reconstructed using a de-
coder. This training is performed for both source and destination
facial expressions. In order to perform a face swap, a trained en-
coder of the source is mapped with a decoder trained on the target
subject’s face. An upgrade to this technique is by adding a gen-
erative adversarial network (GAN) in the decoder [2, 10]. GANs
consist of two modules, a generator and a discriminator. The task
of the generator is to develop images resembling the source while
the discriminator determines if the image is counterfeited. It is
an iterative process, which makes deepfakes realistic as they are
constantly learning.
The availability of such sophisticated techniques for deep-
fake generation in the hands of ordinary researchers and their pos-
sible exploitation by other persons have escalated concerns about
their possible misuse. Applications such as Deepfacelab [20],
FakeApp and OpenFaceSwap are GUI based tools made acces-
sible to relatively untrained researchers to create deepfake videos.
With these tools, it becomes progressively possible for video evi-
dence to be altered for political tension, false video evidence and
fake news. Hence, this poses a challenge for society as well as an
opportunity for creating novel entertainment, but it demands an
effective technique for the detection of such counterfeit video.
Related Work on Deepfake Detection
One approach to deepfake detection focuses on psycholog-
ical signals in the video [16], proposing a detection method by
observing eye blinking in videos, a psychological signal not well
presented in synthesised videos. This is based on a novel deep
learning model combining a convolutional neural network (CNN)
with a recursive neural network (RNN) that captures phenomeno-
logical and temporal regularities in the eye blinking process.
Since the training images used to generate deep fakes do not usu-
ally include images of the subject with eyes closed, this is a clever
approach, though it can be circumvented by intentionally integrat-
ing images into the training data with eyes closed.
The work in [15] exploits colour disparity between GAN-
generated images and real images in the non-RGB colour space
to classify them. Again in the work reported in [18] analysed the
colour difference between GAN images and real images. How-
ever, it is not clear if this approach can be applied to inspecting
local areas in the image, as would be needed in the deepFake case.
The paper which is most similar to our work is by Fernandes
et al. [9], where they investigate the heart rates of people in deep-
fake videos and real videos using Neural ODE. The objective of
this paper is to generate a heart rate from deepfake videos, which
are assumed to have no heartbeat. However, this approach may
not perform very well in case of detecting deepfakes as deepfakes
are usually not stable and are not under perfect lighting condi-
tions, so it can be difficult to obtain a stable heartbeat.
Euler Video Magnification
Eulerian Video Magnification (EVM) [25] is a technique
which can uncover fleeting and hidden details in videos that will,
in general, be hard to see with the human eye. EVM magnifies and
visualises temporal variations in spatial and/or colour aspects in
videos. The method emphasises subtle changes which occur natu-
rally and are encoded within the video but not seen when viewed.
For instance, one can enhance the slight colour changes in videos
which include exposed human skin such as around the face where
the capillaries in the skin show pulsation due to the bloodstream
and blood flow changes caused, in turn from heart rate. This is
similar to Differential Imaging Forensics introduced in [4] which
also reveal latent visual features in videos that are not perceivable
by human observers.
The basis for EVM is that these difficult-to-see changes hap-
pen at specific frequencies that we can expand using a static win-
dow in the frequency space. For instance, in a plucked guitar,
each guitar string resonates at a different frequency, so to amplify
a string’s vibration EVM looks at pixel variations in the respective
frequencies of the note being played. Similarly to amplifying hu-
man pulse visualisation in exposed skin around the face, one can
consider pixel changes in frequencies somewhere in the range 1.0
to 3Hz and process this as it resonates to between 60 and 180
beats per minute.
Figure 1. Euler magnification architecture taken from [25]
The Eulerian amplification process consists of steps shown in Fig-
ure 1. A video is decomposed into images broken down using a
Laplacian pyramid into various frequency ranges. The temporal
changes concerning pixels in all frequency ranges of the Lapla-
cian pyramid are bandpass filtered to select important and relevant
frequency bands which are amplified by a magnification factor
and this outcome is added to the respective signal. Amplified sig-
nals which belong to different frequency bands in the Laplacian
pyramid are flattened to generate the last yield. The key attribute
is the temporal frequency band which can be specified by adjust-
ing the high and low cutoff frequencies for the filter. One way to
consider this is as continuously stacking small variants of the pic-
ture on top of each other. This procedure makes a pyramid shape
with the base as the first picture and gradually compressing as the
pyramid rises.
When we extract the frequency band of interest we amplify
the signal and add it back to the source data. Adjusting the am-
plification factor of the bandpass signal results in a larger boost
to the temporal bandpass. Changing these parameters can make
variations in the scene more apparent but large amplification can
add artefacts to the result.
Video Data For Deepfake Detection
During 2020, AWS, Facebook, Microsoft, and others joined
together to build and run a Deepfake Detection Challenge, offer-
ing a prize fund of US$1M to researchers taking part. The Deep-
fake Detection Challenge Dataset (DFDC) is described in [8]. The
challenge was hosted on the Kaggle website and 2,265 teams took
part in the activity, making more than 3,000 submissions.
The full DFDC dataset consists of 124,000 videos, some of
which are real, some are deepfakes. Subjects in the videos are
from varied ethnicities and have different skin tones, genders,
lighting conditions and head poses, and activities. DFDC deep-
fakes were generated using the whole range of manipulation tech-
niques, such tampering with the intent of representing the real
adversarial space of facial manipulation, though no further details
of methods used were provided to participants in the challenge.
All video clips in the DFDC training set were left at their
original resolution and quality, so deriving appropriate augmenta-
tions of the training set was left as an exercise to researchers.
When the DFDC was complete and results processed, the
best system achieved 82.56% accuracy, based on an ensemble of
techniques. This is important for two reasons. First, because there
are many ways to generate deepfakes, these need to be counter-
acted by using many ways to detect deepfakes. Secondly, because
an individual generation technique may require different detec-
tion techniques, depending on the video that is generated, thus an
ensemble of detection techniques, is appropriate.
Along with the DFDC data set, we generated our own set
of deepfake videos, created using the Deepfacelab application.
Participants’ consent was given and participants signed an agree-
ment approved by the DCU School of Computing Research Ethics
Committee. A group of 30 participants each submitted a video
of 10 seconds recorded in a controlled environment with suitable
lighting at 1080p resolution and the participants remained quite
still unlike some of the DFDC videos. Several face swaps were
performed using the H64, H128 and SAE techniques [17].
These are autoencoder techniques that reduce the data to
smaller dimensions, for example, the H64 model compresses the
data into 64x64 pixels. Each face swap video was trained for
30,000 epochs with a mean loss of 0.0630. All these videos are
of the same dimension as in DFDC dataset with 30 frames per
second. The duration of the videos is 10 secs. A labelled data set
was then created by merging the above data sets and this was also
used in our experiments. All processing was done on an IdeaPad
L340 with an NVidia graphic card GTX 1650 and 8 cores, Cuda
enabled version 10.1.
Methodology
This paper explores the use of Euler Video Magnification as
a way to pre-process video and use the result as an indicator of
whether a video is a deepfake or not. We perform both EVM-
based colour and movement amplification on videos to explore
if the resulting differences can distinguish between original and
deepfake videos.
A related technique to our work on colour-based EVM is
photoplethysmography (PPG) [19]. This is a process to identify
fluctuations in blood volume by shining light of a given wave-
length onto the skin and measuring changes in light assimilation.
The pumping of heart drives blood to the skin surface in an oscil-
lation cycle and it is the differences in the colour of oxygenated
blood that causes changes in light assimilation which is thus a
measure of heart rate. Photoplethysmography can also be used
to recognise human activities [6] but in this paper we are inter-
ested in using colour-based EVM on exposed skin areas such as
the face, to see if a pulse can be detected. Such a process is robust
to different skin tones and small motion of the subject and our in-
terest is to see if such EVM-based pulses are present in deepfakes
as well as in original videos.
Along with measuring minute colour changes, EVM can also
magnify tiny motions by a subject in a video. One of the charac-
teristics of people is natural tremor. This is a naturally occur-
ring oscillatory motion which is frequent but not observable to
the naked eye due to its very small amplitude. Their recurrence is
within the scope of 8 to 12 Hz. These periodic motions have been
observed to stay with age and are caused by compressions that are
caused in muscles of the limbs.
To illustrate this, Figure 2 taken from [24] displays vertical
and horizontal displacements that occur naturally to a participant
while taking a series of burst shot images with a smartphone cam-
era, those displacements being caused by natural human tremors.
The graph was based on 86 burst shots and the circle formed with
red dots marks one standard deviation of movement in any di-
rection. The observation we make from the graph is that human
tremors are symmetrically distributed across all directions. Such
small motions due to natural tremors could be magnified by Euler
magnification so that they may be detectable as a differentiator
between real and deepfake videos.
Figure 2. Horizontal and vertical displacement of camera shots taken in
burst mode, caused by natural tremors, taken from [24].
We processed videos with EVM, both deepfakes and origi-
nals, and then subjected them to three different techniques to ex-
tract features which we used for video classification.
Technique 1: SSIM
The first of the techniques we use is SSIM which is a com-
parison technique used to compare two frames, evaluate their like-
ness and calculate a similarity index for the video based on visual
structures. The Structural Similarity Index (SSIM) is a perceptual
metric that quantifies image quality degradation caused by pro-
cessing such as data compression or by losses in data transmis-
sion, and for deepfake videos, a quality degradation in frames are
due to a less well-trained neural net. It is a full reference metric
that requires two images from similar image capture.
SSIM is calculated based on luminance, contrast and struc-
ture. Comparing the time series of SSIM of an original video and
its EVM equivalent in Figure 3 it can be seen that Euler magnifica-
tion enhances inconsistencies among adjacent frames of deepfake
videos. Such inconsistencies in frames are due to pixelated faces
and such irregularities will have been intensified and magnified as
a result of Euler magnification where the spatial amplification fac-
tor of EVM magnifies the irregularity and hence there are drops
in the similarity index. SSIM is defined in Figure 4 [23].
Figure 3. Inter-frame dissimilarity for original, deepfake, Euler magnified
original and Euler magnified deepfake videos.
Figure 4. Structural similarity index of two windows x and y of common
size N×N. µ is the average value of (x and y). σ 2 is the variance. σ is the
covariance of x and y. c1 and c2 two variables to stabilise the division with
weak denominator.
Technique 2: LSTM
The idea of using a long short term memory (LSTM) net-
work within a neural network architecture is to help the model
learn long term dependencies across the data series. LSTM net-
works were first presented by Hochreiter & Schmidhuber in 1997
[12] and their original idea has been upgraded numerous times.
The LSTM model’s primary objective is to recollect information
over an extensive stretch of time. Unlike an RNN with its single
tanh layer, LSTMs have four strategically arranged modules. On
this basis, LSTM has been used by us for our classification task.
The second technique we use builds on the amount of suc-
cess achieved by CNN models in video analysis, by adding a Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) network into a neural network ar-
chitecture. This can be used to learn any long term dependencies
in a data sequence. The LSTM is coupled with the inception mod-
ule to learn discriminative features from video frames [14].
Inception V3 includes an Inception module where there are
changes in the spatial convolutions to depth-wise separable con-
volutions. Our model is build using CNN network layers for fea-
ture extraction followed by an LSTM layer for temporal analysis
of Euler magnified videos. Our network has fully connected lay-
ers and a dropout layer to make sure that there is no over-fitting.
The total number of trainable parameters used is 5,500,898 and
these are used as input for the LSTM network and 2 node network
working as a detector for deepfake videos from original videos.
To obtain ground truth, the neural network was trained on
videos which were not modified by the Euler magnified method.
The hidden layer had a ‘relu’ activation function, while the last
layer had ‘softmax’ as the activation function. We calculated the
loss and accuracy of the technique on both the training and test
sets. We performed the same sequential steps on the same sets of
the video but on the Euler magnified form of the video for com-
parison on how the technique compares to the standard classifica-
tion techniques. We used an LSTM network with 512 widths and
dropout of 0.5 to randomly set values of outgoing edges of hid-
den layers to zero. The last layer is constructed using a softmax
activation layer to predict video class.
Technique 3: Heart Rate Estimation
When computing Euler magnification on a deepfake video,
we observed that deepfake videos also exhibit pulsation as seen
in Figure 5. Our third technique is to estimate the heart rates of
subjects appearing in videos by focusing on an area of facial skin,
and analysing if any differences in heart rate calculations due to
skin pulsation could be observed between them.
Figure 5. EVM on deepfake video
The main hypothesis behind the work in this paper is to Eu-
ler magnify both source and counterfeit videos in order to extract
features which could highlight skin pulsation or minuscule move-
ment by a subject in the videos. Through pulsation, we can vi-
sualise and thus be able to extract the heart rate of the subject in
the video by calculating the number of colour change peaks and
counting each one as a heartbeat.
EVM can amplify spatial as well as the temporal aspects of
a video. Spatial magnifies the motion while temporal magnifies
colour changes on skin tone. We use the temporal aspect to vi-
sualise the pulse on exposed facial skin. The features of this that
are customisable are filter type, magnification factor and range
of frequency. Videos in our test set were subjected to a range of
EVMs with a frequency range of between 1Hz (60 BPM) and 1.33
Hz (80 BPM). The amplification factor was set to 50. To fetch a
heartbeat, a Fast Fourier transform algorithm was used. The tem-
poral signal was transformed into a frequency domain to fetch the
signal measured in hertz.
Our data set consists of 19.25% of REAL videos which have
not been altered, With the deepfakes accounting for 80.75% of the
samples. There is a huge imbalance between the categories thus
models might be biased towards categorise videos as deepfake
hence the data needs to be up-scaled to balance it.
We used OpenCV [5] to detect the locations of faces in
videos using the face recognition package. We observe that in
some cases, when the subject is not looking frontally at the cam-
era or when the luminosity is low, the algorithm for face detection
does not detect the face or eyes correctly.
Results
The results of our experiments were produced using Python
3 on a computer with 8 GB RAM and a 4 core Ryzen 5 AMD
processor. We used 400 sets of videos from the DFDC Kaggle
dataset [8] and 30 assembled directly by us. We generated 5 video
datasets by changing parameters of Euler magnification, notably
amplification factors. The complete sequence can be divided into
the following steps
1. Create metadata of the videos extracted from multiple
sources;
2. Detect faces and crop video to leave only the face in the
video;
3. Euler magnify the video with a specific frequency range and
amplification factor;
4. Train and evaluate a model on Euler magnified video.
Results for Technique 1: SSIM
As observed anecdotally from multiple graphs of SSIM
scores for videos, there were more similarity score drops in coun-
terfeit deepfake videos when compared to their real video coun-
terparts when magnified by the Euler magnification process. After
magnifying the data using EVM, we calculated SSIM scores for
all videos in the dataset. Deepfake video detection is particularly
difficult to train as the manipulation can be observed only on a
few frames and it is restricted to certain areas of the face. When
there is much movement in the video, there can be inconsistencies
and important areas in the frame appear only briefly.
Below are the results we obtained when we used a range of
standard machine learning models to classify videos:
Technique Logistic Decision NNet NNet +Regression Tree LSTM
Original Videos 68.7% 65% 77% 77%
EVM Videos 53.7% 62% 70% 62%
These results are below the 82.56% accuracy achieved by the
best-performing submission to the DFDC but that was based on an
ensemble while our results are one single technique. The results
show consistently that SSIM-derived features are more discrimi-
native of real vs. deepfake videos, before Euler Video Magnifi-
cation was applied, suggesting that our default settings for EVM
could be tweaked to improve performance.
In the table below, we processed our test videos with Euler
magnification with multiple amplification factors (15, 20, 30, 40
and 50). The frequency band was restricted to between 0.8hz and
1.0 Hz. As we can see from the results the lower amplification
factor performed better than the higher amplification factor. In
these videos, a higher amplification factor led to additional noise
which blocked some of the features in the videos. This indicates








Results for Technique 2: LSTM
We ran the Inception v3 inspired LSTM model for 100
epochs to give the following results on our test video set. For
these experiments we found that classification on the original un-
processed videos was more accurate and outperformed classifica-
tion accuracy when EVM had been applied to the videos on an
amplification factor of 30.
Video set Accuracy Loss
Original Videos 77.24% 0.88
EVM Videos 61.79% 2.52
This result is another apparent setback to the idea of using EVM
for deepfake detection. The difference in accuracy between orig-
inal and EVM videos is even more pronounced than in Model 1.
Results for Technique 3: Heart Rate Estimation
A comparison of heart rate based on pulsation observed in
the Euler magnified video of an original and a deepfake video
revealed that beats per minute (BPM) for both the videos were
very similar, with slight changes only in the first decimal position.
As an example in Figure 6, the heart rate of both the orig-
inal and deepfake videos came to 65.78 beats per minute (1.096
Hz). Thus the temporal variance calculated through Euler video
magnification is insufficient to differentiate deepfake from origi-
nal videos [3].
Subjects appearing in both deepfake videos and original
videos have an estimated heartbeat which is indistinguishable.
This reveals that the GANs used for creating the deepfakes does
not simply superimpose a new image of the subject on top of the
real image which could have concealed facial pulsation colour
changes, but the GAN manages to faithfully model the true data
distribution of the real data at the pixel level and in this way it
keeps the colour-temporal changes from the genuine video, intact.
Conclusions
In this paper, we tested the effect and impact of Euler Video
Magnification as a technique for video pre-processing leading to
possible detection of deepfake videos. Both the colour and the
spatial aspects of EVM were tested as possibilities for a number
of classification models we built for discriminating between real
and deepfake. We used accuracy as a metric, even though accu-
racy is known not to be a great metric for evaluation when using
Figure 6. Heartbeat calculation using Fast Fourier transform on EVM of
Original and Deepfake video
imbalanced datasets like ours, which is why we include accuracy
figures for both original and EVM processed videos, so we can
compare.
What the accuracy performance figures do not show is that
using EVM vs. not using EVM as a video pre-process actually de-
tects different videos, so it is not the case that EVM pre-processing
simply eliminates some videos from being accurately classified as
real or deepfake. Thus we should include a range of metrics in-
cluding Precision, Recall, F1 and others so as to more fully under-
stand what EVM is doing, but as this paper is preliminary work,
that forms part of future work.
The results of the best performing systems at the Deepfake
Detection Challenge [8] achieved an accuracy of 82.56% across
a much larger test dataset than we have used here, so we cannot
compare our results directly against the data in the full DFDC
results. However because these best results were based on en-
sembles of techniques, it follows that the more variety among the
systems used in the ensemble, the better will be will be the final,
overall result.
We believe that our results help us to understand how deep-
fake video generation incorporate pulsation information and sub-
ject tremor motion into their generated videos. In future work, we
would like to explore the most difficult facial objects to alter like
lips and eyes, for fake detection as well as a deeper exploration
into the results by using different evaluation metrics. We would
also investigate different feature sets and limit the parameters of
EVM to focus on its impact. We would also like to explore how
compression artefacts in video storage interact with the EVM pro-
cess as it is possible it is masking the contribution of EVM.
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Sugasa Marangonda, Chris Umé, Jian Jiang, Luis RP, Sheng
Zhang, Pingyu Wu, et al. Deepfacelab: A simple, flexi-
ble and extensible face swapping framework. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2005.05535, 2020.
[21] Simranjeet Singh, Rajneesh Sharma, and Alan F. Smeaton.
Using GANs to synthesise minimum training data for deep-
fake generation. In Proceedings of the 28th Irish Conference
on Artificial Intelligence & Cognitive Science Dublin, Ire-
land http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2771/, pages 193–
204, December 2020.
[22] Justus Thies, Michael Zollhofer, Marc Stamminger, Chris-
tian Theobalt, and Matthias Nießner. Face2face: Real-time
face capture and reenactment of RGB videos. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition, pages 2387–2395, 2016.
[23] Zhou Wang, Eero P Simoncelli, and Alan C Bovik. Multi-
scale structural similarity for image quality assessment. In
The 27th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems & Com-
puters, volume 2, pages 1398–1402. IEEE, 2003.
[24] Bartlomiej Wronski, Ignacio Garcia-Dorado, Manfred
Ernst, Damien Kelly, Michael Krainin, Chia-Kai Liang,
Marc Levoy, and Peyman Milanfar. Handheld multi-frame
super-resolution. ACM Transactions on Graphics, 38(4):1–
18, 2019.
[25] Hao-Yu Wu, Michael Rubinstein, Eugene Shih, John Gut-
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